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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal presents an interesting question concerning 
the authority of a federal district court to preliminarily decide 
  
procedural issues as well as the arbitrability of a labor 
grievance where the union party seeks arbitration.  Troy Chemical 
Corporation (Troy Chemical) and the Teamsters Union Local No. 408 
(the Union) are parties to a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA).  On April 23, 1991, Troy Chemical discharged four 
employees for theft of company property and immediately notified 
the union shop steward of the discharges.  No grievances were 
filed by the Union or the individuals pursuant to the CBA.   
 On January 28, 1993, the Union notified the New Jersey 
State Board of Mediation that a dispute existed over the 
discharge of one of the four employees, and requested that an 
arbitrator be selected.  On May 14, 1993, the mediation board 
advised the parties that an arbitrator had been selected and a  
hearing was scheduled for October 20, 1993.  On May 24, 1993, 
Troy Chemical commenced an action in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a declaratory 
judgment that any disputes over the discharged four employees 
were not arbitrable because the Union had not complied with the 
grievance procedure.1 
 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.   
The district court denied Troy Chemical's motion and granted the 
Union's motion for summary judgment, holding that the parties had 
modified by past practice the CBA provision pertaining to the 
                     
1
.  The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 3 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 185.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  
grievance procedure for discharges and that the grievances 
regarding the four employees were arbitrable.  Troy Chemical 
appealed.  We reverse. 
 I. 
 The Union represents production and maintenance 
employees of Troy Chemical's Newark, New Jersey specialty 
chemicals manufacturing facility.  Article 11 of the CBA2 
                     
2
.  The pertinent provisions of the Article 11 are: 
 
 A.  Should any difference, grievance, dispute 
or complaint between the Company and the 
Union or any employees arise out of the 
interpretation or application of the 
Agreement, there shall be an earnest effort 
on the part of both parties to settle same 
promptly and through the steps hereinafter 
set forth, it being understood and agreed 
that no grievance shall be accepted for 
consideration unless reduced to writing and 
presented in the first step within two (2) 
working days of the occurrence of the 
incident causing the grievance.  This shall 
not, however, apply to grievances involving 
payroll calculation. 
 
 * * * 
 
 The dispute referred to herein shall include, 
but shall not be limited to disputes 
concerning the discharge of an employee . . . 
. 
 
 * * *  
 
 C.  Except as expressly provided otherwise in 
this Agreement, with respect to any dispute 
which is required to be submitted to 
arbitration pursuant to the Agreement, 
including strikes, stoppages, lockouts and 
any and all claims, demands and acts arising 
therefrom which are subject to arbitration, 
the procedure established in this Agreement 
  
provides that no grievance shall be accepted for consideration 
unless reduced to writing and presented within two working days 
of the occurrence of the incident causing the grievance.  The 
only exception to this requirement is grievances involving 
payroll calculations.  Step two of the grievance procedure 
requires a conference between representatives of Troy Chemical 
and the Union within three days of the incident giving rise to 
the grievance.  If there is no settlement of the dispute after 
the completion of these two steps, then the matter may be 
submitted to arbitration.  Paragraph A of article 11 states, 
"[t]he dispute referred to herein shall include, but shall not be 
limited to disputes concerning the discharge of an employee."  
Paragraph C of article 11 provides that, "the procedure 
established in this Agreement for the adjustment of said dispute 
shall be the exclusive means for its determination."  Article 11 
has remained unchanged in the more than 15 years of successive 
three year collective bargaining agreements between the parties. 
 The district court acknowledged that express contract 
language made it "abundantly clear that a written grievance is to 
be submitted . . . for all disputes concerning discharged 
employees."  Nevertheless, the court found that the parties had 
historically acquiesced in the waiving of the grievance procedure 
in connection with discharges.  Relying on New Jersey law, the 
court held that the parties had modified the CBA by their 
(..continued) 
for the adjustment of said dispute shall be 
the exclusive means for its determination. 
  
practice of ignoring steps 1 and 2 of the grievance procedure in 
connection with discharges, and therefore, the grievances 
regarding the four employees were arbitrable.  In his opinion, 
the arbitrator repeatedly noted that he was bound by the district 
court's legal and factual conclusions that the grievance was 
procedurally and substantively arbitrable. 
 On appeal, Troy Chemical contends that the district 
court erred in ruling on matters of procedural arbitrability and 
in holding that parties had modified the express terms of the CBA 
by disregarding the grievance procedure provisions pertaining to 
employee discharge.  The Union takes the position that the 
district court correctly found a waiver of the grievance 
procedure steps based on the past practices of the parties.  
 II. 
 This court exercises plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment, and we apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized initially.  Oritani Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. 
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is demonstrated that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  An 
issue of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  In 
deciding a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.  Oritani, 989 F.2d at 
  
638.  We therefore conclude that the appropriate standard of 
review is plenary, rather than clearly erroneous, as suggested by 
the Union. 
 The law governing the proper forum for determining 
various issues of arbitrability is set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 
543 (1964).  In that case, a dispute arose between the employer 
and the union over whether the contract covered the merged 
employees of the successor company, and whether the union's 
failure to follow the grievance procedure foreclosed arbitration.  
The Court stated that the first issue was a matter of substantive 
arbitrability to be decided by the court, but that the issue of 
whether the failure to adhere to the grievance mechanism barred 
arbitration was a procedural question for the arbitrator.  The 
Court explained: 
 It would be a curious rule which required 
that intertwined issues of "substance and 
procedure" growing out of the same facts had 
to be carved up between two different forums, 
one deciding after the other.  Neither logic 
nor considerations of policy compel such a 
result. 
 
Id. at 557.  The Court concluded: 
 
 Once it is determined, as we have, that the 
parties are obligated to submit the subject 
matter of a dispute to arbitration, 
"procedural" questions which grow out of the 
dispute and bear on its final disposition 
should be left to the arbitrator. 
 
Id.  
  
 Several years later, the Supreme Court reiterated its 
view that procedural arbitrability should be resolved by 
arbitrators, not the courts.  In International Union of Operating 
Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487 (1972), the 
company opposed arbitration on the grounds that the union's long 
delay in filing for arbitration constituted laches.  The court of 
appeals upheld the district court's ruling that the issue of 
whether laches existed was one to be decided by the court, not 
the arbitrator.  The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that the 
contract between the parties stated that the grievance and 
arbitration procedure should be applied to "any difference" that 
arose between the parties, and the question whether the 
arbitration was barred by laches was "a difference" to be decided 
by the arbitrator.  406 U.S. at 491.  Relying on Wiley, the Court 
emphasized that a court should determine in the first instance 
whether the parties had in fact agreed to arbitrate the subject 
matter, "[b]ut once a court finds, as here, the parties are 
subject to an agreement to arbitrate, and that agreement extends 
to 'any difference' between them, then a claim that particular 
grievances are barred by laches is an arbitrable question under 
the agreement."  Id. at 491-92. 
 In the present action, article 11 of the CBA speaks of 
"any difference, grievance, dispute or complaint" and 
unambiguously states that "disputes concerning the discharge of 
an employee" are subject to the grievance procedure and 
arbitration.  Thus, whether the Union and Troy Chemical had by 
practice waived steps 1 and 2 of the grievance procedure was a 
  
question of procedure for the arbitrator and not the court.  See 
Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. USAir, Inc., 960 
F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that once the court 
determines that the underlying grievance is covered by the 
arbitration clause, the court's role ends; "[b]eyond this, the 
court usurps the exclusive function of the arbitrator when it 
ventures to decide procedural matters, or the merits of a 
grievance arising under the collective bargaining agreement"). 
 It is only on appeal that the Union argues that the 
district court properly considered whether the parties waived the 
grievance procedure steps based on their past practices.  In its 
answer to the complaint for declaratory judgment, the Union 
averred as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff has not 
challenged the substantive arbitrability of the dispute, but 
raises only questions of procedural arbitrability, which are for 
the arbitrator not the court to decide.  Moreover, before the 
district court, the Union argued that under well-settled 
principles of labor law the issues of arbitrability and waiver 
are committed to the arbitrator.  The Union stated in its brief, 
"[t]he Union does not ask this Court to decide these questions.  
On the contrary, it is not this Court's function to do so.  
Rather, these issues are proper subjects for the arbitrator in 
determining whether the grievance is barred by procedural 
defects."   
 Therefore, once the district court found that the 
discharges were subject to arbitration, the court should have 
denied the declaratory judgment and held that the issue of 
  
whether the grievances were barred by procedural defects was 
arbitrable.  The district court erred in deciding the procedural 
questions and foreclosing that issue from the arbitrator's 
decision. 
 III. 
 Finally, the district court erred in granting the 
Union's motion for summary judgment because the record shows that 
there are disputed questions of fact.  For example, the Union 
lists the names of employees who previously arbitrated without 
following the grievance procedure provisions, but it does not 
give any specific dates or the names of the arbitrators, and all 
of the cases alleged to have waived the grievance procedure were 
written before the last CBA was entered into in 1989. In light of 
the vagueness of the Union's evidence and the subsequent renewal 
of the grievance procedure provisions in the CBA now before us 
for construction, there is a question as to whether the Union's 
evidence is credible.   
 Additionally, the Union avers by affidavit that 
discharges were treated differently because the contract language 
in article 11 treats the discharge as a unique part of grievance 
with special rights, and that Union representatives met with 
Alexander Gerardo, Troy Chemical's Vice President of Human 
Resources, and that he advised them to wait to submit this matter 
to arbitration because he expected a quick investigation of the 
arrests by the law enforcement people.3  Yet, the Union fails to 
                     
3
.  The Union further avers that as a practical matter, Troy 
Chemical knows what the grievance is in discharge cases, i.e., 
  
point to any such language that gives discharge cases any special 
rights or shows that they are treated differently.  In fact, the 
grievance forms provided by the Union to its members specifically 
cautioned that all complaints or grievances must be in writing, 
properly signed by the members and shop steward.  "Unless 
completed in detail, the grievance will not be acted upon."  
Moreover, Gerardo, by his affidavit, denies having met with Union 
representatives and denies that he discussed the issue of the 
timeliness of the filing or instructed the Union to delay in 
pursuing this matter at any step in the required procedures.  
Gerardo further avers that Troy Chemical did not enter into any 
understandings or agreements which relieved the Union from their 
obligation in the grievance procedure.  Troy Chemical, as the 
non-moving party, was entitled to all reasonable inferences.  
Upon remand, these factual disputes are matters that should be 
resolved by the arbitrator.  
 IV. 
 The district court exceeded its authority in 
determining whether the grievance procedure had been complied 
with and whether there had been a modification of article 11.  
Once the court decided that the discharges were subject to 
arbitration, it should have held that the dispute was arbitrable 
and that matters relating to compliance with the grievance 
(..continued) 
the Union is aggrieving the discharge of particular persons.  
However, the purpose of the grievance procedure is not merely to 
give notice, but rather it is to give the parties the opportunity 
to confer, ascertain the facts, and promptly settle the matter in 
the workshop, if that is at all possible.   
  
procedure or a waiver were matters for the arbitrator. 
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
vacated and the case remanded to the district court with 
instructions to return the case to the arbitrator for de novo 
consideration.  Costs taxed against the appellee. 
